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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-USE OF STATE FUNDS FOR TRANSPORTATION OF CHILDREN TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS*
Under a New Jersey statute1 authorizing its local school districts to make rules and contracts for the-transportation of children
to and from schools, defendant board of education authorized reimbursement of money expended by parents for transportation of
their children on commercial busses. Part of tis
money was for
payment of transportation of some children in the community to and
from Catholic parochial schools. These church schools give secular
education and regular religious instruction conforming to the religious tenets and modes of worship of the Catholic faith. A taxpayer's suit was filed challenging the right of the Board to reimburse parents of parochial school students. The Supreme Court
held that the Board had the right to make such a reimbursement
stating: "The state contributes no money to the schools. It does
not support them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more than
provide a general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from ac'2
credited schools.
A strong dissenting opinion,' concurred in by three justices,
was written by Mr. Justice Rutledge attacking the majority's holding as a violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution, made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment:"
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
,,3
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
The minority based its view on what seems to be the sounder
reasoning. For the purpose of this discussion, it will be well to
look at the history of the First Amendment. Incessant wrangling
between sects for public support and what was felt to be obnoxious taxation for the support of the church provided the incentive for a strict separation of church and state. Jefferson and
Madison were successful in getting a Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom0 through the Virginia Assembly. Madison was later sent
* Tins note which takes a view contra to the decision by the
Supreme Court is published as a compamon note to the one by Mr.
Hopkins on P 328 agreeing with the case.
1
N. J. REv. STAT (Cum. Supp. 1941) 18-14-8.
"Everson v. Bd. of Education of Ewing Township,-U. S.-,
91 L. Ed. 472, 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 513 (1947).
"See Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Everson v. Bd. of Education of Ewing Township, - U. S. 91 L. Ed. 472, 486, 67 Sup.
Ct. 504,
517 (1947).
4
Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292, 63 Sup.
Ct. 870 (1943)
'U. S. CONST. AMEND. I.
'See Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Everson v. Bd. of Education of Ewing Township, - U. S. -, 91 L. Ed. 472, 486, 67 Sup.
Ct. 504. 517 (1947)
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to the First Congress to establish a similar freedom for the nation
and proposed such a measure, which became the First Amendment.
To Madison, religion was wholly a private matter beyond the
scope of civil power either to restrain or to support.'
The problem of support manifests itself in the form of numerous
attempts to obtain public funds in aid of religious institutions. In
the category of cases upholding such aid, the extreme case seems
to be State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd Public funds were used here to
pay teacher's salaries to Catholic Sisters teaching in several schools
which were formerly operated as parochial schools. Except for
state aid, these schools would have been forced to close. Religious
services were discontinued during school hours but the students who
formerly attended these schools continued to attend them without
regard to the school district m wich they lived. In an action to recover salaries paid to the Sisters as teachers, it was held that public
supervision of the curriculum and the fact that no religious instruction was given during school hours was sufficient to denominate
these schools as "public" schools. However, eight other jurisdictions
have denied the validity of attempted use of public funds by sectarian institutions as violating the principle of separation of the
church and state.'
It would seem that the same problem is presented in several
cases involving the furnishing of textbooks by the state to students m
parochial schools. Thus, in Louisiana, free textbooks were furnished
all school children on the basis that private schools were not the
beneficiaries of the appropriation but that the children and the state
alone were the beneficiaries.' This case was appealed from a decision
of the Louisiana Supreme Court upholding such action on the
authority of Borden v. Loutsiana State Board of Education'" decided
the same day, in which three Justices. dissented on the ground that
the purchasing of books to be used in sectarian schools is to use such
money "indirectly" if not "directly" in aid of the church conducting
the schools. Similarly, transportation furnished children going to
parochial schools in Baltimore County, Maryland, was held to be
a public function and a valid exercise of the state's police power
" Ibzd.
'217 Ind. 348, 28 N. E. 2d 256 (1940).
9
Knowlton v Baumhouer, 182 Iowa 691, 166 N. W 202 (1918)
Atchison, T. & S. F Ry. v. City of Atchison, 47 Kan. 712, 28 Pac.
Williams v. Bd. of Trustees Stanton School District,
1000 (1892)
173 Ky. 708, 191 S. W 507 (1917) Jenkins v Inhabitants of Andover, 103 Mass. 94 (1869) State ex rel. Public School District No. 6
v. Taylor, 122 Neb. 454, 240 N. W 573 (1932) State ex rel. Nevada
Orphan Asylum v Hallock, 16 Nev. 373 (1882), Collins v Kephart,
Synod of Dakota v State, 2 S.
271 Pa. 428, 117 Atl. 440 (1921)
D. 376, 50 N. W 632 (1891)
" Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Education, 281 U. S. 370,
74 L. Ed. 913, 50 Sup. Ct. 335 (1930).
" 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929).
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for the protection of children from traffic hazards.'" It may be noted
that the religious issue was not raised by the majority of the court m
these cases. However, the dissenting opinions in these cases considered such aid to be a contribution to a sectarian school. It nught
be worthwhile to note here also that these cases, which have upheld such action, arose in states which have had large Catholic
populations throughout their history
The position of the minority of the court in the Everson case is
supported by numerous decisions. In Smith v. Donahue/' the New
York court said, "
the parochial schools are furnished by the
Roman Catholic Church, in order that, along with secular education,
the youth of the Church may receive instructions in its religious
beliefs and rules. In accord with its principles in that respect, the
state will not interfere, but it may not assist in aid of any distinct
religious tenet."' 4 As to furnishing books and supplies to the pupils,
the court goes on to say, "We think the act plainly comes within
the prohibition of the Constitution (State) if not directly in aid of
the parochial schools, it certainly is an indirect aid.""
Contrary to the Baltimore County transportation case, the majority of decisions involving the furnishing of transportation to
pupils attending a sectarian school hold that such action is an appropriation of moneys in aid of the school and for this reason is
unconstitutional. 6 State ex rel Traub v. Brown," held, "
we are
of the opinion that to furnish free transportation to pupils attending
sectarian schools, is to aid the schools. It helps build up, strengthen
and make successful the schools as organizations." The court further
commented that it was not impressed by the reasoning in the Louisiana textbook cases. In a later case, the New York Court became
more emphatic and ruled that furnishing of transportation at public
expense to pupils attending parochial schools is unconstitutional as
a use of public money in aid of a school or institution of learning
in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught.'
Legal writers have criticized granting such aid under the argument that the pupil*is the beneficiary. The basis of their opinions
is that the logical result of such argument would justify the use of
public funds to pay practically all the expenses of a private or
parochial school and thus a result would be achieved indirectly
that could not be achieved directly' 6 Another writer has foreseen a
"BEd. of Education of Baltimore County v Wheat, 174 Md. 314,
199 Atl. 628 (1938).
"202 App. Div. 656, 195 N. Y. Supp. 715 (1922)
"Id. at 195 N. Y. Supp. 715, 719 (1922).
"Ibid.
'"Note (1941) 141 A. L. R. 1136, 1152.
" 6 W W Harr. (36 Del.) 181, 172 Atl. 835 (1934)
"Judd v Bd.of Education, 278 N. Y. 200, 15 N. E. 2d 576 (1938)
"Note (1938) 37 MiCi. L. REV. 335.
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reawakening of internal religious strife as a result of departing from
a strict separation of church and state, saying: "Entrance of the
state upon a program of religious subsidy, however benign, reawakens the slumbering forces of intolerance and hate and invites
'
them to a contest for public support."
It is submitted that the decision of the majority of the Supreme
Court in the New Jersey school board case is another step toward
returning to the situation existing at the time of the enactment of
the First Amendment. When the problem arises again, it would
seem to be in the public interest for the Court to retreat to the line
of decisions which held that such state aid was in aid of the church
which seems to be the only logical interpretation of such action.
This appears to be the only possible way to avert the inevitable
consequences of increased taxation and public religious wrangling
that are sure to result if the door is opened wider.

Joinr G.

'Note

(1941)

50 YALE L. J. 917, 926.
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